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Abstract
In this paper, we examined whether the regularization law approved in Italy in 2002 led to changes
in the fertility of immigrant women. We used the Birth Sample Survey, published by the Italian
Institute of Statistics, to show that the Italian regularization increased the probability of having the
first child by approximately 6 percentage points, whereas point estimates of the probability of having
additional children beyond the first were negative, but not significant. By exploring alternative
specifications, focusing on individuals eligible to receive the status of regular immigrant through
employment, we find evidence of a stronger effect with respect to our baseline results. Robustness
analyses confirmed our main findings.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, the political party of the Italian center-right voted
for an immigration law to combat irregular immigration and implement more restrictive
rules for regular immigrants (Law 189/2002, i.e., Bossi-Fini Law). Despite the intention,
only the Art. 33 of the Bossi-Fini Law concerning regularization became immediately
effective after its official publication in July 2002, while the rest of the law was only
approved in early 2005. Thus, during this two-and-a-half-year period, regularization was
the most far-reaching measure used to increase the number of regular immigrants and to
reveal illegal foreign workers.
The regular immigrants were included in the official labor market by way of permits to
stay and the annual renewal of these permits depended on the existence of an employment
contract. Numerically, 705,000 irregular immigrants were made eligible for regularization
and, of these, 650,000 were approved. It should be noted that, of the foreigners who
obtained permits to stay in 2003 more than 78% still had valid permits to stay in early
2007 (Avallone 2017). That is, the effect of regularization programs was to effectively
initiate a course of legality for most formerly illegal immigrants. Conditional on being
employed in Italy, regularized immigrants obtained access to formal labor market and,
as a consequence, enjoyed lower risks of losing their job, obtained social contributions
for pensions, improved their access to healthcare and, in general, decreased their shadow
price of integration.
The increasing number of regular immigrants in Italy generated sharp testable pre-
dictions for possible unintended effects allowing us to analyze the interplay between im-
migration policy and fertility transitions in a country characterized by low fertility rates
and may explain the slight recovery between 2001 and 20081(Goldstein et al. 2009). We
argue that, as predicted by the standard Quantity-Quality (Q-Q) model of Becker &
Lewis (1973), policies improving immigrants’ opportunities in the host country reduce
the price of child quality exerting possible effects on fertility decisions. So far, several
papers have documented that the number of children and their quality (e.g., education,
health, well-being) are affected by the price of quality (see, for example, Bleakley & Lange
(2009), Qian (2009), Becker & Woessmann (2010)). Focusing on immigrants, Avitabile
1At the turn of the 21st century, more than half of Europe’s population lived in societies with TFRs at or below the
threshold of lowest-low fertility, put at 1.3 (Kohler et al. 2002). In 2001, Italy recorded a TFR at 1.26.
2
et al. (2014) investigated the effects of the German reform of citizenship at birth on im-
migrants’ fertility choices. Applying the Q-Q model, they find that legally recognized
citizenship status increased investments in child quality and reduced the optimal num-
ber of children. However, they did not consider that differences in fertility choices may
arise between women at the first pregnancy (extensive margin) compared to women that
already had children (intensive margin).
In this paper, we follow the extension of the Q-Q model of Becker & Lewis (1973),
proposed by Aaronson & Mazumder (2009) and Aaronson et al. (2014), which accounts
for different propensities in fertility decisions of women facing an improvement of their
opportunities. The ’extended’ Q-Q model defines child quantity and quality as comple-
mentary for mothers at their first pregnancy, since it is necessary to have at least one child
in order to invest in quality, and as substitutes for mothers with already at least one child.
In particular, Aaronson et al. (2014) examined fertility choices for two generations of rural
black women in the American South in response to a large-scale school-building program
(Rosenwald Initiative). Findings indicate that schooling opportunities for prospective
children of rural black women reduced the price of child quality and increased their prob-
ability to have the first child.
We provide an empirical model to test the theoretical predictions of the extended Q-
Q model and identify whether and how immigrant mothers, who changed their status
from irregular to regular, varied their fertility outcomes. We used data from the Birth
Sample Survey (BSS) conducted by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2002 and
2005 and concerning interviews with mothers between July 2000 and June 2001 (wave1)
and in 2003 (wave2), respectively. The years in which the surveys were conducted are
precisely those before and after the immigration law came into force and, thanks to this
feature, we can adopt a difference-in-differences (DD) model combined with a propensity
score matching (PSM) estimator (i.e., propensity score difference-in-differences, PSDD)
to estimate the effects of the massive regularization of illegal immigrants on childbearing
in Italy. The combination of these two methods allows us to account for time-invariant
unobservable characteristics, which differ between treatment group - immigrant mothers
with foreign nationality - and control groups - immigrant mothers with acquired Italian
nationality and Italian mothers - comparing only those mothers with the most similar
observable characteristics.
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We find that leaving the status of illegal immigrant has significant benefits on the
probability of having a first child, which increases by 6−7 percentage points with respect
to the control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality. Consistent
with the idea that parents substitute quality for quantity only at the intensive margin
we show that point estimates of immigrant mothers’ intentions to have other children
are negative, although estimated parameters are not statistically significant. Extended
analyses are carried out by focusing on family fertility decisions when subsamples of
employed fathers or mothers are taken into account. The results suggest that, when we
considered only individuals directly eligible for regularization, the probability of having
the first child is stronger in magnitude, but not significantly different from our baseline
estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical model
and derives its testable predictions. Section 3 summarizes changes produced by the regu-
larization law in combating illegal immigration in Italy. Section 4 describes the data and
our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and robustness, while Section
6 discusses the potential confounding of changes in the sample composition before and
after the immigrants’ regularization. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we outline a synthetic framework that departs from Becker & Lewis (1973)
and describes how regularization policies can affect fertility choices. While a general
theoretical model is beyond the scope of this work, standard assumptions are introduced
to generate some testable implications of the extended Q-Q model (Aaronson &Mazumder
2009, Aaronson et al. 2014).
Parents maximize a utility function U(c, n, q), that depends on the consumption of
goods and services (c), number of children (n) and the ’quality’ per child (q). The optimal
level of fertility is determined under a nonlinear budget constraint given by: nπn+nπqq+
cπc = I, where πc is a unitary price for consumption, πn represents the fixed cost for
rearing children, which is not affected by the decision on children quality investments, πq
is the direct cost of investing in children, which also depends on the quantity of children
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(n) and I is the household income. According to this simple model, a decrease in πq will
increase investments in child quality and, by contrast, will have a negative effect on the
number of children, since the shadow price of quantity (πn + πqq) increases.
Within this framework, the regularization law can be seen as a reduction in πq, since
regular immigrants will avoid adverse wage shocks, at least at household level, along
with the long-term non-economic benefits connected to the possibility to obtain permits
to stay for relatives, legal protection in the case of criminal charges and the use of the
healthcare service. Previous studies demonstrated that having a regular position in the
labor market exposes women to a lower risk of losing their jobs and positively affects access
to house mortgages. Prifti & Vuri (2013) showed that job protection for regular workers
improved access to credit with the possibility of creating a family and reducing feelings
of future economic insecurity and, in turn, did act as a baby booster for Italian working
women2. In addition, the regular position in the labor market favors the access to major
social housing programs, allowing immigrants to move to different places with respect to
their own networks (Boeri et al. 2015), where children may arise with more opportunities
(Facchini et al. 2015). The legal status promotes better use of prenatal care services by
immigrant pregnant mothers. Salmasi & Pieroni (2015) and Chiavarini et al. (2016) found
that newborns’ health status improved after the Italian regularization. Ceteris paribus,
regularizations can have a permanent effect on investment in child quality, for both the
first child and other children, and this may induce an improvement in terms of economic
status for new generations (Currie 2009, Carvalho 2012).
Considering all the above mentioned aspects, we can conclude that regularization ex-
panded opportunities for immigrants and for their prospective children, reducing the price
of child quality - πq - and, according to the standard Q-Q model, also the total number of
children. This interpretation is in accordance with that of Avitabile et al. (2014). How-
ever, as previously discussed, the relationship between quality and quantity is non-linear
across household fertility levels, and it turns from complementarity (at low fertility lev-
els) to substitution (at high fertility levels). Baudin et al. (2015) show that the transition
from being childless to primiparous provides an increase in households utility, without
which the interaction of quality and quantity in the budget constraint cannot become
2Dustmann et al. (2017) also suggested that labor market regularization in Italy produced a positive shift in immi-
grants consumption decisions. Their findings estimated that undocumented immigrants consuming about 40% less than
documented immigrants.
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effective. Aaronson et al. (2014) define the extension of the relationship between quality
and quantity at low fertility levels as ’essential complementarity’, because households can
consume their good (i.e., child quality), only if they have at least one child.
As an example, consider that V (I) is the indirect utility associated to remaining child-
less, and V (I, πn, πq) is that of a woman with at least one child. If V (I, πn, πq) > V (I) the
decision to have the first child will be taken. It is clear that, under these assumptions, any
change implying a decline in πq will increase V (I, πn, πq) without affecting V (I), and this
will induce more women to decide to have a child. In our setting, regularized women with-
out children will experience an increase in V (I, πn, πq) and will have an incentive to have
their first child, while regularized women with already at least one child, will experience
a decline in total fertility due to the increase in the shadow price of child quantity.
3 The regularization of immigrants through the 189/2002 Ital-
ian law
Law 189/2002 was the most important legislation to be introduced in an European coun-
try, only equaled later by the 2005 regularization law in Spain, that provided the status of
regular immigrant to illegally resident individuals on the Italian soil. The law is composed
of a set of rules to regulate the flow of migrants into Italy and to combat illegal immigra-
tion. This law also imposed more restrictive rules for regular immigrants, linking permits
to stay with work contracts, and made procedures for renewals more expensive. However,
the application of these restrictive conditions was delayed until February 2005 and only
Art. 33, which mainly aimed to regularize domestic workers and personal assistants (care
assistants), was immediately applied starting from its official publication in July 2002.
The regularization law was later also extended to individuals employed in other sectors
of the economy under Legislative Decree 195/20023.
The massive regularization of foreign workers provides an exogenous variation in the
status of legal immigrant, and represents our main identification strategy. It is worth
noting that the legislative procedure of this law started in the February 2002, with Senate
approval. Formally, employers’ declarations had to be sent to the Italian Institute of
Social Security (INPS), together with a payment of 700 euros to cover the welfare costs
3Self-employed, unemployed, and family members were excluded from regularization.
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for the three months before the amnesty, as well as other administrative costs. Demands
for regularization had to be presented between September and November 2002. Then,
workers requiring regularization and their employers were invited by the prefecture of
the municipality of residence to verify the demand. If all the necessary conditions were
met permits to stay were released during the same meeting. Operations were significantly
faster compared with similar procedures carried out previously, despite a higher number of
applications. Almost all permits to stay were administratively granted in the last months
of 2002, giving us an even better idea of the extent of this regularization, after which the
number of regularly employed foreign workers virtually doubled (Bonifazi et al. 2009).
Official data reveals some salient features of the evolution over time of immigration
policies in Italy. Until the late 1990s, regularization policies displayed a strong gender
imbalance: the percentage of regularized women in 1998 amnesties was around 30%,
whereas after the Regularization Law 189/2002, women accounted for almost 46% of
applicants. This increase in the proportion of women among regularized immigrants was
the result of greater migration from areas such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe, pulled
by the demand for employment in domestic jobs and care assistants during the positive
business cycle of the Italian economy. The total number of permits to stay issued to
immigrant women from countries of the former Soviet Union was of 383,000, i.e. nearly
60% of the total amount, almost doubling the numbers of women from the same area
already legally residing in Italy.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
The main dataset used in this study is the BSS published by ISTAT in 2002 and 2005.
This survey lists interviews of about 100,000 and 30,000 mothers for the long and short
versions, respectively. We refer to both versions of the BSS because only the short version
includes items concerning fertility intentions. The main information collected by both
surveys regard the mother’s and father’s socio-demographic details and the newborn’s
health status.
The BSS collects information for a representative sample of foreign-born mothers whose
fertility choices are of particular interest to the aims of the present study and represent our
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treatment group. The BSS also allows us to identify the following control groups composed
by mothers that were not eligible for regularization: (i) women born outside of Italy with
acquired Italian nationality and (ii) Italian women. Interviews were collected between July
2000 and June 2001 in the first wave (wave1) and in 2003, in the second wave (wave2).
We argue that, given the procedure previously described to apply for regularization and
to obtain the permit to stay, a relevant share of - if not all - applications were already
approved by the end of 2002, allowing us to observe the effects of the regularization already
in 2003. Unfortunately, we do not have information about fertility outcomes after this
date, but since this goes against finding a policy effect, if we estimate a significant effect
despite it - as we show later - then our results should be even more convincing and, at
most, interpreted as a lower bound of the true effect.
Table 1 lists the proportion of immigrant and Italian mothers who had babies for both
the long (upper panel) and short (lower panel) versions of the BSS. The share of immigrant
mothers, about 6-7% of the sample, does not vary substantially between the two waves
and samples. Table 1 also shows the share of immigrant women, with or without Italian
nationality in each wave. We can observe an increase in the percentage of immigrant
mothers who decided to have a child by 7-8 percentage points, after the immigration
law came into force. If we assume that the ethnic composition of immigrant women
did not vary significantly between waves, it is reasonable to expect that the increase in
the probability to have a child born to immigrant mothers spurred by the prospect of a
reduction in socio-economic vulnerability due to the 2002 regularization.
Table 2 shows the distribution and the percentage variation of permits to stay granted
to immigrants before and after the 2002 regularization. As we can observe, there are large
differences for some ethnic groups. The most marked increase is observed for women from
Central and Eastern Europe (+104%), but also permits to stay for immigrants from
other countries experienced large variations, e.g. Europe (+66%), North and West of
Africa (+35% and +32%), East Asia (+36%) and Central and South America (+58%).
Looking at these figures, one may think that the increase in fertility of immigrant mothers
observed in Table 1 is the result of variations in sample composition towards ethnic groups
with higher total fertility rates (TFRs) rather than of the Italian regularization. We will
devote further analyses in the next sections of the paper to show that this problem does
not represent a threat to our identification strategy and provide evidence that: (i) the
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distribution of births did not follow the same trend as the distribution of permits to
stay, and (ii) the variation in fertility imputable to the composition of migrants is very
limited and cannot be the only explanation for the observed variation in fertility after the
regularization.
Table 1: Share of immigrant and Italian mothers.
Nationality
Wave Observations Italian Italian (acquired) Foreign
Long-version of the Birth Sample Surveys
Wave1 49,093 0.936 - 0.064
Wave2 48,018 0.931 - 0.069
Wave1 3,153 - 0.683 0.317
Wave2 3,380 - 0.602 0.398
Short-version of the Birth Sample Surveys
Wave1 16,100 0.935 - 0.065
Wave2 15,149 0.934 - 0.066
Wave1 1,043 - 0.695 0.305
Wave2 1,007 - 0.619 0.381
Source: Our estimates from Birth Sample Surveys.
Table 2: Number of permits to stay issued and percentage variations before and after the 2002 regular-
ization.
2002 2003 % var. 2002/2003
Area of origin Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
European Union 60,664 90,202 150,866 59,020 89,174 148,194 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
Central and Eastern Europe 232,396 235,038 467,434 413,399 479,151 892,550 0.78 1.04 0.91
Other European countries 9,167 12,099 21,266 9,120 12,091 21,211 -0.01 0 0
Europe 302,227 337,339 639,566 481,539 580,416 1,061,955 0.59 0.72 0.66
North Africa 186,777 80,281 267,058 261,828 98,675 360,503 0.4 0.23 0.35
West Africa 65,279 32,871 98,150 87,679 41,591 129,270 0.34 0.27 0.32
East Africa 9,751 16,835 26,586 10,641 17,740 28,381 0.09 0.05 0.07
Central and Southern Africa 5,295 4,353 9,648 5,969 5,040 11,009 0.13 0.16 0.14
Africa 267,102 134,340 401,442 366,117 163,046 529,163 0.37 0.21 0.32
West Asia 12,064 6,571 18,635 12,472 6,956 19,428 0.03 0.06 0.04
East Asia 62,561 84,736 147,297 92,088 107,586 199,674 0.47 0.27 0.36
Central and South Asia 74,594 40,605 115,199 114,388 47,000 161,388 0.53 0.16 0.4
Asia 74,625 91,307 165,932 104,560 114,542 219,102 0.4 0.25 0.32
North America 17,286 31,203 48,489 16,821 31,038 47,859 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Central and South America 39,651 89,712 129,363 66,507 138,319 204,826 0.68 0.54 0.58
Americas 56,937 120,915 177,852 83,328 169,357 252,685 0.46 0.4 0.42
Oceania 1,204 1,476 2,680 1,170 1,487 2,657 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
Stateless 387 228 615 385 232 617 -0.01 0.02 0
Total 702,482 685,605 1,388,087 1,037,099 1,029,080 2,066,179 0.48 0.5 0.49
Source: Data from Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
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4.2 Fertility outcomes
Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for the fertility outcomes used in our analysis.
First, we obtained a measure of fertility which identifies the share of women that had
their first child in the two waves. It emerges that immigrant mothers having their first
child increased by 5 and 12 percentage points in between the two waves looking at the
long and short versions, respectively. The same share decreased for mothers with acquired
Italian nationality (from 0.39 to 0.36 in the long version and from 0.38 to 0.35 in the short
version) and remained stable for Italian mothers.
The second line of Table 3 lists the average number of children from immigrant and
Italian mothers. There is evidence of a reduction in the number of children delivered
to immigrant mothers over the immigration regularization changes period, which fell by
around 10 points in both the long and short versions of BSS. The control groups displayed
limited changes over these two years. This also implies that mothers with at least one
child had a lesser propensity to deliver children in these years, in accordance with the
suggestion of the Q-Q theory. However, there is a clear limitation to using the number of
children as an outcome of total fertility in our sample. In fact, we can observe a very short
fertility window for mothers who delivered newborns before and after the immigration
regularization of the law 198/2002, such as we cannot estimate the completed fertility of
mothers, which would be needed to test the extended Q-Q theory.
Alternatively, we use the intention to have other children to proxy effects on total fertil-
ity. Even though the fertility intentions may reflect also current conditions of individuals
or households, rather than future prospects, they represent a powerful predictor of fertility
behavior (Thomson et al. 1990, Schoen et al. 1999, Berrington 2004). In this respect, we
use the short-version of the BSS, which included the following question: ”Do you want
to have other children in the future?” to build an indicator to proxy total fertility. Ta-
ble 3 shows that there is a positive, although small, change in the fertility intentions of
immigrant mothers and a stable trend for the control groups.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show descriptive statistics of the BSSs (short
and long versions) for the variables of interest in our analysis by mother’s nationality
(i.e., mother’s and father’s age, years of residence in Italy, employment, marital status,
education, and wealth). Clearly, the group of foreign-born mothers differs in terms of
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Table 3: Fertility outcomes
Immigrant Immigrant Italian mothers
mothers mothers
(but with acquired
Italian nationality)
Variable Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2
Long-version of the BSS
Mothers having their first child 0.44 0.49 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.44
Number of children 1.68 1.59 1.71 1.74 1.69 1.69
Short-version of the BSS
Mothers having their first child 0.39 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.43
Number of children 1.68 1.57 1.69 1.73 1.68 1.69
Intentions to have other children (1+) 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.42
Source: Our estimates from Birth Sample Surveys.
observable characteristics from those of foreign-born mothers with acquired Italian na-
tionality and Italian mothers, especially according to age, occupational status, and wealth
(measured by a set of dummy variables which evaluate whether the accommodation where
the respondent lives is owned or rented, and by the number of rooms in it).
4.3 Empirical strategy
The impact of the Italian immigration law on births is estimated using the PSM in a DD
model, i.e., PSDD (Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2002)). The use of PSDD estimator has
become standard practice in the evaluation literature for the case of single treatments,
although some extensions to multiple treatments have been proposed (e.g., Moreno-Serra
(2008)). The main advantage of this approach is the possibility of accounting, among
treatment and control groups, for differences in initial conditions and other time-invariant
unobservable characteristics with the DD strategy and to reduce, preliminary, the bias
induced by differences in observable characteristics with the PSM approach.
We formalize our empirical framework starting from the classical DD model, expressed
as follows:
Y lit = γ0 + γ1Ti + γ2T imet + γ3(T × T ime)it +
H∑
h=1
ψhXith + ǫit (1)
where Y lit is a binary indicator for woman i at time t, who measures l = 1, 2 outcomes
of interest represented by: (i) the probability to have the first child or (ii) the intentions
of having children in future. Ti is a dummy variable indicating treatment status for each
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individual. Immigrant women without Italian nationality represent our treatment group,
since they are eligible to receive the status of regular immigrant through employment. We
select two control groups that, according to the potential outcome framework, should be
valid proxies of fertility choices for our treatment group in the absence of treatment. These
two groups of women cannot be directly affected by the 2002 regularization, but should be
able to capture variations in other conditions (e.g., income, health, education) incurred in
the same years of the regularization and possibly correlated to fertility decisions. T imet
is a time dummy variable which takes value 1 for observations collected during wave2 and
0 otherwise.
The coefficient associated with Ti, γ1, captures any pre-existing difference among treat-
ment and control groups; the coefficient associated with T imet, γ2, is a proxy for unob-
served variables not associated with the immigration law which may affect treatment and
control group fertility. The effect of regularization is captured by γ3, estimated as the
interaction between Ti and T imet.
Treatment and comparison groups may differ in terms of both unobservable and ob-
servable characteristics, suggesting that these sources of heterogeneity have a role to play
in determining variations in migrant women’s fertility decisions (Sobotka 2008). Legal
and illegal immigrants in Italy are groups of people with distinct characteristics, possibly
correlated with fertility behaviors, that if not taken into account may bias our estimates.
For instance, if our treatment group after the regularization results in younger women
with high education, it could be that the estimated increase in fertility is attributable
to such changes rather than to the regularization. Variations in the ethnic composition
of immigrants shown in Table 2 may also lead to unbalance the samples and bias our
estimates, since the large increase in women from Eastern and Central Europe (+104%),
mainly middle aged and involved in low-skill jobs as domestic workers and care-givers,
affects births (see, Appendix A.4-A.5.).
Although this selection into treatment should be mitigated by the fact that regular-
ization was assigned as a sort of amnesty to almost all applicants, we used the PSM to
further mitigate its influence. Combination with the PSM estimator ensures that indi-
viduals in the treatment group are compared with their counterparts in the comparison
group, who are similar according to observable characteristics. Blundell & Dias (2000)
show that the combined PSDD estimate of γ3 is given by the following equation:
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γˆ3,PSDD =
1
NTa
∑
i∈Ta∩S

(Y l,Tai − ∑
i∈Ca∩S
WijY
l,Ca
j
)
−

 ∑
j∈Tb∩S
WijY
l,Tb
j −
∑
j∈Cb∩S
WijY
l,Cb
j



 (2)
where Ta and Ca represent the treatment and control groups after regularization. Tb
and Cb represent the same groups before the immigration law came into force. S is
joint common support, defined as the subset of treated individuals who are matched for
the construction of each counterfactual group. NTa represents the number of treated
individuals who also belong to joint common support S. As before, Y l is either: the
probability to have the first child or the intention to have children. Wij is the weight
attributed to matched individual j when compared with treated individual i. From an
empirical point of view, matching on covariates X must be performed three times for each
treated individual: the first time between Ta and Tb to find comparable treated individuals
in the period before the law came into force, the second time between Ta and Ca and, the
third, between Ta and Cb, to find comparable individuals in the comparison group before
and after implementation of the law, respectively.
We also take into account the fact that the standard errors of ordinary least squares
for the DD estimator may not be accurate in the presence of serial correlation within
groups and between time periods. This problem has been specifically analyzed for the
case with two groups and two time periods by Donald & Lang (2007) and Bertrand et al.
(2004). Here, we use the two-step estimator proposed by the former authors as the most
appropriate method to obtain consistent standard errors.
5 Results
5.1 Preliminary: the propensity score matching analysis
The results of the matching strategies for balancing covariates are listed in Table 4. We
compare covariate distributions between the treatment and control groups before and af-
ter matching, using the variables already described in the previous section and listed in
Appendix A.1 and A.2. We calculate the median and mean of the absolute standardized
bias and the pseudo R− squared index, using nearest-neighbor, radius and kernel match-
ing methods. Panel 1 of Table 4 shows the results using the long-version of the BSS.
Irrespective of matching strategy and control group, median and mean bias are reduced
13
drastically, meaning that differences among treatment and control groups (i.e., immi-
grant mothers with Italian nationality and Italian mothers) in observable characteristics
decrease significantly after matching. In addition, the pseudo R− squared fell to almost
zero after matching. We find similar matching results for the short-version of the BSS
(Panel 2 of Table 4).
The right part of Table 4 lists the number of observations in treated and comparison
groups before and after each matching. In both versions of the BSS, we note how a
small number of observations is discarded after matching in the case of kernel and radius
matching, whereas a relatively larger number is lost with the nearest-neighbor method.
This difference is explained by the fact that the nearest-neighbor strategy uses only those
observations which represent the best matches for treated individuals, whereas the kernel
and radius methods, using a wider set of observations, are more efficient but may be
affected by higher levels of bias (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2005). Similar results are found
for the short-version of the BSS.
5.2 Main estimates
Table 5 (panel a) shows the estimates on the probability of having the first child for reg-
ularized immigrant women using immigrant women with acquired Italian nationality as
control group. Remind that part of immigrant mothers reside and work in Italy but only
illegal women were potentially exposed to regularization. The left part of the table shows
standard DD estimates of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), with the corre-
sponding number of observations; the right part lists PSDD estimates of ATT obtained
from three matching strategies, nearest-neighbor, radius and kernel4. Although DD esti-
mates reveal a slight increase in the probability to have the first child after regularization,
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level
(0.029;S.E. = 0.023). Instead, the PSDD estimates indicate that the exposure to the
regularization law increases the probability to have the first child by about 6− 7 percent-
age points. Note that, the effect estimated after radius matching is larger than others
(0.0684;S.E. = 0.032), even if the coefficient is not significantly different from those ob-
tained with other methods, thus we can conclude that the matching procedure does not
4DD estimates were obtained by including the same control variables used for matching observations in the PSDD
estimator.
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Table 4: Tests for balancing covariates, before and after matching
Matching Absolute standardized bias Pseudo R-squared Treated group Comparison group
Method Median Mean Observations Observations
Before After Before After Before After Before After Lost Before After Lost
1. Long-version of the BSS - Outcome: the probability of having first child
(1.a) Control group: immigrant mothers with Italian nationality
N 4.3 0.8 6 1.1 0.026 0.001 2344 2217 127 4189 4039 150
R 4.3 0.7 6 1.6 0.026 0.003 2344 2217 127 4189 4086 103
K 4.3 1 6 1 0.026 0.001 2344 2217 127 4189 4086 103
(1.b) Control group: Italian mothers
N 5.4 0.6 6.5 0.8 0.017 0 2344 2217 127 90578 35661 54917
R 5.4 2.7 6.5 2.9 0.017 0.003 2344 2217 127 90578 89156 1422
K 5.4 0.7 6.5 1.1 0.017 0.001 2344 2217 127 90578 89156 1422
2. Short-version of the BSS - Outcome: fertility intentions
(2.a) Control group: immigrant mothers with Italian nationality
N 3.1 1.2 4.4 2 0.01 0.003 701 657 44 1349 606 743
N - 1st child 3.1 1.4 4.4 2.2 0.01 0.004 320 280 40 519 171 348
R 3.2 1.1 4.2 1.9 0.01 0.003 701 657 44 1349 613 736
R - 1st child 3.2 1.5 4.2 2.3 0.01 0.004 320 280 40 519 212 307
K 3.3 1.1 4.4 1.9 0.01 0.003 701 657 44 1349 613 736
K - 1st child 3.3 1.8 4.4 2.2 0.01 0.003 320 280 40 519 212 307
(2.b) Control group: Italian mothers
N 6.9 2.6 9.3 2.3 0.041 0.004 701 657 44 29189 12009 17180
N - 1st child 12.8 4.3 13.2 6.2 0.095 0.021 320 280 40 12563 5543 7020
R 6.9 2.5 9.3 2.2 0.041 0.003 701 657 44 29189 28824 365
R - 1st child 12.8 4.9 13.2 5.1 0.004 0.056 320 280 40 12563 12340 223
K 6.9 1.6 9.3 1.8 0.041 0.003 701 657 44 29189 28824 365
K - 1st child 6.5 1.8 8.3 2.3 0.056 0.006 320 280 40 12563 12340 223
Note: Matching methods, N=Nearest-neighbor; R=Radius; K=Kernel.
affect our results.
When we use Italian mothers as the control group (Table 5, panel b), we confirm the
results obtained in previous estimates. We find significant effects of regularization on the
probability of having the first child for immigrant mothers, after matching with radius
and kernel, but with smaller magnitude (3 percentage points).
Tables 6 and 7 show the effect of regularization on fertility intentions. First, we use
the intention to have other children as an outcome of total fertility since all women in our
samples delivered at least one child. Point estimates in Table 6 highlight a negative effect
of regularization on the intention to have other children, but this effect is never statistically
significant, except when we used the kernel matching algorithm and the control group of
Italian mothers. Second, as the theory suggests, women substitute out of quantity into
quality such as the impact on total fertility depends on the magnitude of the increase
along the extensive margin and declines along the intensive margin. We proxy the last
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fertility effect by using the subsample of mothers who had their first child. Unsurprisingly,
the results listed in Table 7 are in accordance with those obtained in Table 6, showing a
negative, though not significant, effect on fertility intentions after regularization.
These results reveal opposing effects along the extensive and intensive margins, al-
though appear to be not in according with the prediction of the standard Q-Q model.
Instead, they are more consistent with the definition of ’essential complementarity’ pro-
posed by Aaronson et al. (2014), which may arise for women at the first pregnancy. For
immigrant mothers, the Italian regularization can be viewed as a decline in the price of
the child quality, as the program led to improvements in both labor market access and
job quality, and stimulated increases in the value of having a child for the group of child-
less immigrant women. But it should also lead mothers (or parents) to invest more in
the quality of children, predicting that fertility will decline along the intensive margin
because quantity and quality become substitutes at higher fertility levels. This second
prediction is not statistically confirmed by the data. A possible explanation may be that
the duration of the permit to stay was initially limited to one year, after which a renewal
was required. This improved immigrants’ conditions in Italy in the short run but not in
the medium/long-run perspective which, in turn, constrained investments in child quality.
Importantly, looking at the results only based on standard Q-Q model might have led us
to mistakenly conclude that the Italian regularization had no effect on the fertility of
immigrant mothers. Enhancing the model to distinguish between the separate effects of
’essential complementarity’ and the quantity-quality trade-off enables us to show that the
effect was significant at least for women at their first pregnancy.
5.3 An extension of the effect of immigrant regularization: a family back-
ground
In this section, we test the robustness of our significant baseline estimates on the proba-
bility of having the first child, considering families where lives at least one individual that
was eligible for regularization. We argue that regularization may induce positive effects on
fertility either directly, for employed women, or indirectly, for unemployed women married
to an employed man.
The DD model shown in equation (1) is extended defining two subgroups of the popu-
lation. The first subgroup includes families where the father is in employment, while the
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Table 5: Effect of the immigration law on probability of having first child, marginal effects
DD PSDD
ATT Observations Matching method ATT Observations
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
0.029 6303 Nearest-neighbor 0.0601* 6256
(0.023) (0.034)
Radius 0.0684** 6303
(0.032)
Kernel 0.0599* 6303
(0.031)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
0.0074 91,373 Nearest-neighbor 0.0317 37,878
(0.071) (0.031)
Radius 0.034** 91,373
(0.014)
Kernel 0.0382** 91,373
(0.019)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
second includes families with mothers or fathers in employment5. In particular, the lat-
ter subgroup was used to evaluate whether the combined effect of regularization on both
parents is more effective in increasing the probability of having the first child. Formally:
Yit = γ0 + γ1T
k
i + γ2T imet + γ3(T
k
× T ime)it +
H∑
h=1
ψhXith + ǫit (3)
where superscript K = 1, 2 corresponds to the already described subgroups and Yit in-
dicates only the probability of having the first child. Consequently, PSDD estimates are
obtained from:
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The results of matching procedures are similar to those of the whole sample. Also in
this case, the PSM obtained with the same methods as before (nearest-neighbor, kernel
and radius) performs well in reducing bias from observable covariates (see, Appendix A.3).
5We do not show estimates for the subgroup of families where both parents are currently employed because the number
of observations would be too small to guarantee reliable estimates.
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Table 6: Effect of the immigration law on intentions to have other children, marginal effects
DD PSDD
ATT Observations Matching method ATT Observations
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
-0.0618 1270 Nearest-neighbor -0.0418 1263
(0.389) (0.054)
Radius -0.0388 1270
(0.049)
Kernel -0.0127 1270
(0.038)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
-0.0321 29,481 Nearest-neighbor -0.0482 12,666
(0.331) (0.029)
Radius -0.0481 29,481
(0.029)
Kernel -0.0528* 29,481
(0.031)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
Table 8 shows the results focusing on families where father is employed. Looking at the
PSDD estimator, ATTs are generally significant and point estimates of the probability
to have the first child range from 7 to 8 percentage points, using mothers with acquired
Italian nationality, and from 3 to 4 percentage points when compared to Italian mothers.
Estimates of the probability of having the first child are very similar to those obtained
from the subgroup of employed fathers or mothers (Table 9). Compared with mothers
with acquired Italian nationality, the positive effect is stable (i.e., around 7-8 percentage
points), while it is slightly higher (i.e., 5 and 6 percentage points) than previously esti-
mated when Italian mothers are used as control group. Overall, these results support the
hypothesis that regularization had an indirect effect on unemployed mothers through fa-
thers that were employed before 2002 and that obtained the status of regular immigrant,
stimulating immigrant families to have a new child.
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Table 7: Effect of the immigration law on intentions to have other children, subsample of women who
had first child, marginal effects
DD PSDD
ATT Observations Matching method ATT Observations
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
-0.1162 492 Nearest-neighbor -0.0104 451
(0.364) (0.200)
Radius -0.0101 492
(0.200)
Kernel -0.0204 492
(0.211)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
-0.073 12,620 Nearest-neighbor -0.0524 5823
(0.263) (0.106)
Radius -0.0524 12,620
(0.106)
Kernel -0.0559 12,620
(0.152)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
6 Potential confounding
The permits to stay described in Table 2 indicate a change in the composition of the
treatment group such as the positive point estimates of the effects of Italian regularization
on the probability of having the first child may be partially explained by a change in the
composition of the immigrant group. Here, we examine the possibility that our results
are capturing the effect of the group composition of immigrants exposed to regularization,
rather than the effect of the reform, on the fertility decisions of immigrants.
Although ISTAT does not provide data about births from mothers with foreign na-
tionality among its official statistics, we requested an ad hoc process to have access to a
hitherto unpublished database to obtain this information. For comparison, we summarize
the results in Table 10, with the same aggregation provided in Table 2. We also show
raw data at country level in Appendix A.4-A.5. There is definite evidence of variations in
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Table 8: Effect of the immigration law on probability of having first child on a subsample of newborns
from families where only the father is employed, marginal effects
DD PSDD
ATT Observations Matching method ATT Observations
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
0.0271 3748 Nearest-neighbor 0.0737*** 3714
(0.029) (0.025)
Radius 0.079** 3748
(0.033)
Kernel 0.0755** 3748
(0.033)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
0.0169 41,205 Nearest-neighbor 0.0244*** 20,790
(0.084) (0.007)
Radius 0.0432*** 41.205
(0.003)
Kernel 0.0381*** 41.205
(0.007)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
terms of births in favor of Eastern European women (+15%), associated with an almost
stable variation of newborns from African mothers (-4%). However, the difference between
the two groups as regards to births is less marked than that estimated on permits to stay
(see, Table 2). As column 3 of Table 10 shows, the variation of newborns from mothers
of foreign nationality is very limited, with an overall incidence of 3%; we conclude that
this result is not large enough to bias our estimates significantly.
We also prove that variations in the population of immigrant women had a very limited
influence on TFR before and after the 2002 regularization law was applied. For a more
precise idea of how variations in the composition of births may affect TFR, we estimate
the average TFR of immigrants for each geographical area of origin. Then, we calculate
the average TFR by geographical area of origin, weighted by two indicators: (i) the
number of women with foreign nationality before and after the regularization and (ii) the
total number of deliveries from mothers without Italian nationality before and after the
2002 regularization. From these figures, we analytically calculated the variation in TFR
between the years. In other words, we calculate what should have been the change in
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Table 9: Effect of the immigration law on probability of having first child on a subsample of newborns
from families where either the mother or father is employed, marginal effects
DD PSDD
ATT Observations Matching method ATT Observations
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
0.0286 6124 Nearest-neighbor 0.0738*** 6077
(0.024) (0.027)
Radius 0.0783*** 6124
(0.027)
Kernel 0.0736*** 6124
(0.028)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
0.0059 88,962 Nearest-neighbor 0.0633* 36,645
(0.072) (0.038)
Radius 0.0517** 88,962
(0.021)
Kernel 0.0492** 88,962
(0.025)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
TFR between 2002 and 2003, associated exclusively with the variation of the immigrant
population in favor of nationalities with lower TFR. As columns 6 and 9 of Table 10
show, the absolute variation of TFR is always very limited, with an overall incidence of
−1%, when weighted by number of births, and of −7% when weighted by the number of
permits to stay. From this result we can argue that the variation in the ethnic composition
happened towards countries with lower TFRs, and should be responsible for a decrease in
births from regularized immigrant women. Despite this, we found a significant increase
to deliver their first child for immigrant mothers. This implies that at most our results
are downward biased by the change in sample composition and should be interpreted as
a lower bound for the true effect.
Lastly, the presence in our sample of immigrants arrived in Italy after 2002 could
represent a threat to our identification strategy. We know from official sources that the
majority of immigrants who received the status of regular immigrant were already in Italy
before 20026. However, we also know that a part of the population of immigrants in 2003
6Almost 80 per cent of those regularised in the 2002 amnesty arrived in Italy before that year, with over 70 per cent in
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could be represented by new arrivals, and this could explain the estimated increase in
immigrant women fertility. We already shown in Table 1 that the share of immigrants
in our sample is very stable but, to provide more convincing evidence on this regard, we
propose a robustness that excludes from our baseline estimates individuals who declared
to be arrived in Italy from less than 2 years. In this way we are sure that all immigrants
in our sample were in Italy before 2002, excluding the possible negative effects induced
by new arrivals on our estimates. These results are shown in Appendix (Table A.6) and
estimated coefficients are very similar to those provided in our baseline estimates.
Table 10: Total number of newborns and TFR for mothers of foreign nationality.
Newborns from mothers Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
of foreign nationality weighted by n. of births weighted by n. of permits to stay
Area of origin 2002 2003 var. 2002 2003 var. 2002 2003 var.
European Union 508 389 -0.23 1.76 1.74 -0.01 1.68 1.68 0
Central and Eastern Europe 9646 11045 0.15 1.46 1.45 -0.01 1.43 1.4 -0.02
Other European countries 36 36 0 1.62 1.54 -0.05 1.56 1.56 0
Europe 10190 11470 0.13 1.48 1.46 -0.01 1.5 1.44 -0.04
Northern Africa 9301 8902 -0.04 2.23 2.25 0.01 2.21 2.21 0
Western Africa 2479 2406 -0.03 4.6 4.63 0.01 4.48 4.54 0.01
Eastern Africa 325 355 0.09 3.7 3.69 0 4.23 4.2 -0.01
Central and Southern Africa 212 219 0.03 4.7 4.84 0.03 4.58 4.63 0.01
Africa 12317 11882 -0.04 2.79 2.82 0.01 3.1 3.09 0
Western Asia 279 293 0.05 2.56 2.61 0.02 2.28 2.24 -0.02
Eastern Asia 3876 3795 -0.02 2.06 2.07 0.01 2.3 2.22 -0.03
Central and Southern Asia 3085 3172 0.03 2.45 2.44 0 2.37 2.4 0.01
Asia 7240 7260 0 2.24 2.26 0.01 2.32 2.27 -0.02
Northern America 53 48 -0.09 1.95 1.98 0.02 1.99 1.99 0
Central and Southern
America
1526 1721 0.13 2.2 2.2 0 2.08 2.12 0.02
America 1579 1769 0.12 2.19 2.2 0 2.06 2.1 0.02
Oceania 7 8 0.14 1.81 1.84 0.02 1.81 1.84 0.02
Stateless 0 3 - - - - -
Total 31333 32392 0.03 2.21 2.18 -0.01 2.16 2.01 -0.07
Notes: Data on newborns from mothers of foreign nationality obtained from ISTAT ad hoc processing service while TFR
obtained from Central Intelligence Agency (2013)
7 Conclusions
Currently, Italy is one of the main immigration countries in Europe, with many foreign
residents; this implies that immigration represents the vanguard of the political agenda,
because there is an increasing concern over its economic and social consequences. If we
the 1999-2001 period (Blangiardo & Tanturri 2004)
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look at Italian history, for almost a century after its unification, Italy was one of the
leading European countries in terms of emigration, but this phenomenon stopped in the
second half of the 1970s and Italy became a country with large immigration flows sustained
by economic growth. The publics initial tolerant attitude towards immigration and the
weak response to governing immigration helped to consolidate regular immigration flows
based on labor market quotas. However, this recruitment never worked properly. The
rationing of residence permits, which arose due to increasing rhetoric against immigration,
encouraged illegal immigration and, in turn, the recurring need for regularization programs
(Mastrobuoni & Pinotti 2015).
In this paper, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the number of legal immi-
grants in Italy - working in domestic services, as care assistants, and in industry - induced
by the application of the law on regularization enacted in the second part of 2002, to
study the impact on the probability of having the first child or other children, proxied
by fertility intentions. We find that regularized immigrant women has an increased prob-
ability of having the first child (extensive margin) because of their better employment
prospects and occupational standing. By exploring if fertility decisions occurred within
families, we find that alternative specifications, focusing on individuals directly eligible
for regularization, i.e, employed fathers and employed fathers or mothers, are larger but
not significantly different from our baseline estimates.
In our context, the inflow of regular immigrants was beneficial to economic and social
outcomes in Italy (Vianello et al. 2019). This does not imply that the regularization
of immigrants should necessarily improve also the fertility rate. Rather, although the
legal right to stay allows immigrants to plan their life under lower economic and social
risks and increase opportunities for their prospective children, the prediction of the Q−
Q model suggests a reduction in the price of child quality and total fertility. While
our findings suggest that regularization affected the increase in the extensive margin of
fertility, the prediction of a reduction of the number of children for immigrants was not
statistically significant. The motivation for the latter result may be that the time horizon
at that the majority of regularized immigrants only had a short permit to stay linked
with the duration of their job contract that could be not sufficient to decide to invest
in child quality. The positive employment and income shock induced by regularization
may therefore have influenced the expectation to become a mother for immigrant women,
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leaving out the perspective of living in Italy for the long term. These observations suggests
that one needs to be careful when extrapolating these results in other contexts and that
the time horizon of the rights assigned by immigration policies may have different impacts
on immigrants’ fertility decisions.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics: short version of the Birth Sample Surveys
Mothers born Mothers born Italian mothers
outside Italy outside Italy
(but with acquired
Italian nationality)
Variable Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2
Mother’s age: ≤ 29 0.53 0.62 0.46 0.4 0.43 0.41
Mother’s age: 30-39 0.39 0.31 0.5 0.54 0.49 0.5
Mother’s age: ≥ 40 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09
Mother’s years of residence: 0-7 0.49 0.55 - - - -
Mother’s years of residence: 8-14 0.32 0.28 - - - -
Mother’s years of residence: ≥ 15 0.18 0.16 - - - -
Mother is unemployed 0.75 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.42
Mother is employed 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.47 0.58
Mother is employed with a temporary contract 0.43 0.46 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.23
Mother is employed with a full time contract 0.57 0.54 0.82 0.75 0.84 0.77
Mother is married 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.1
Mother is not married 0.87 0.81 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.9
Mother’s education: degree 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.19
Mother’s education: secondary school 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.53
Mother’s education: primary school 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.29
Previous dead children 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.17
Previous abortions 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Father was born in Italy 0.65 0.69 0.92 0.9 0.97 0.97
Father was born outside Italy 0.35 0.31 0.08 0.1 0.03 0.03
Father’s age: ≤ 29 0.19 0.2 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.21
Father’s age: 30-39 0.54 0.51 0.6 0.65 0.62 0.62
Father’s age: ≥ 40 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17
Father’s years of residence: 0-7 0.73 0.78 - - - -
Father’s years of residence: 8-14 0.12 0.09 - - - -
Father’s years of residence: ≥ 15 0.15 0.13 - - - -
Father is unemployed 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03
Father is employed 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97
Father’s education: degree 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.15
Father’s education: secondary school 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.5 0.45 0.46
Father’s education: primary school 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.39
House: owned 0.51 0.38 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.2
House: rented 0.49 0.62 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.8
Number of rooms > 2 0.29 0.3 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
Number of rooms <= 2 0.71 0.7 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
Observations 318 383 725 624 15,053 14,136
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics: long version of the Birth Sample Surveys
Mothers born Mothers born Italian mothers
outside Italy outside Italy
(but with acquired
Italian nationality)
Variable Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2 Wave1 Wave2
% of low birth weight 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Mother’s age: ≤ 24 0.31 0.33 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14
Mother’s age: 25-29 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.27
Mother’s age: 30-34 0.24 0.22 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31
Mother’s age: 30-34 0.12 0.1 0.16 0.2 0.17 0.19
Mother’s age: ≥ 40 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
Mother’s years of residence: 0-7 0.51 0.54 - - - -
Mother’s years of residence: 8-14 0.32 0.3 - - - -
Mother’s years of residence: ≥ 15 0.16 0.15 - - - -
Mother unemployed 0.69 0.67 0.56 0.54 0.47 0.42
Mother employed 0.31 0.33 0.44 0.46 0.53 0.58
Mother married 0.13 0.2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.1
Mother not married 0.87 0.8 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.9
Mother’s education: degree 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.18
Mother’s education: secondary school 0.5 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.52
Mother’s education: primary school 0.3 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.34 0.29
Previous children born dead 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Previous abortions/miscarriages 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17
Father born in Italy 0.66 0.67 0.91 0.91 0.97 0.97
Father born outside Italy 0.34 0.33 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03
Father’s age: ≤ 24 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05
Father’s age: 25-29 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.16
Father’s age: 30-34 0.31 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.33
Father’s age: 30-34 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.29
Father’s age: ≥ 40 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.17
Father’s years of residence: 0-7 0.04 0.04 - - - -
Father’s years of residence: 8-14 0.11 0.1 - - - -
Father’s years of residence: ≥ 15 0.14 0.13 - - - -
Father unemployed 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Father employed 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96
Father’s education: degree 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14
Father’s education: secondary school 0.48 0.5 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.47
Father’s education: primary school 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.4 0.42 0.39
Accommodation: rented 0.42 0.35 0.2 0.18 0.19 0.15
Accommodation: owned 0.47 0.6 0.68 0.76 0.71 0.78
Accommodation: other title 0.1 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.1 0.07
Number of rooms ≤ 2 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17
Number of rooms > 2 0.7 0.72 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83
Observations 1000 1344 2153 2036 45940 44638
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Table A.3: Tests for balancing covariates, before and after matching, long version of the British Sample
Surveys
Matching Absolute standardized bias Pseudo R-squared Treated group Comparison group
Method Median Mean Observations Observations
Before After Before After Before After Before After Lost Before After Lost
(a) Control group: immigrant mothers with Italian nationality
N - (M&F) 5 0.8 6.1 1.2 0.028 0.001 2280 2158 122 4049 3919 130
N - (F) 6.4 1.7 7.9 1.7 0.03 0.002 1595 1493 102 2311 2221 90
R - (M&F) 5 0.7 6.1 1.6 0.028 0.004 2280 2158 122 4049 3966 83
R - (F) 6.4 0.9 7.9 1.7 0.03 0.003 1595 1493 102 2311 2246 65
K - (M&F) 5 0.7 6.1 1 0.028 0.001 2280 2158 122 4049 3966 83
K - (F) 6.4 0.9 7.9 1.1 0.03 0.001 1595 1493 102 2311 2246 65
(b) Control group: Italian mothers
N - (M&F) 5.4 0.5 6.3 0.7 0.017 0 2280 2158 122 87890 34487 53403
N - (F) 3.8 0.9 5.9 1.5 0.016 0.002 1595 1493 102 40391 19297 21094
R - (M&F) 5.4 2.6 6.3 2.8 0.017 0.003 2280 2158 122 87890 86804 1086
R - (F) 3.8 2 5.9 2.5 0.016 0.004 1595 1493 102 40391 39703 688
K - (M&F) 5.4 0.7 6.3 1.1 0.017 0.001 2280 2158 122 87890 86804 1086
K - (F) 3.8 0.5 5.9 0.9 0.016 0.001 1595 1493 102 40391 39703 688
Note: Matching methods, N=Nearest-neighbor; R=Radius; K=Kernel. F: families where only father is employed; M&F:
families where mother or father are employed.
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Table A.4: Number of newborns and TFR for immigrant mothers, by country of nationality
Country code Country Area of origin Number of TFR
newborns
2002 2003
AFG Afghanistan Central and Southern Asia 0 1 5.43
ALB Albania Central and Eastern Europe 4870 5126 1.5
DZA Algeria Northern Africa 356 455 2.78
AGO Angola Central and Southern Africa 18 31 5.43
SAU Saudi Arabia Western Asia 1 0 2.17
ARG Argentina Central and Southern America 46 66 2.25
ARM Armenia Western Asia 5 1 1.64
AUS Australia Oceania 4 5 1.77
AUT Austria European Union 13 10 1.43
AZE Azerbaijan Western Asia 3 5 1.91
BGD Bangladesh Central and Southern Asia 596 771 2.45
BEL Belgium European Union 18 15 1.65
BLZ Belize Central and Southern America 0 1 3.02
BEN Benin Western Africa 33 26 5.04
BLR Belarus Central and Eastern Europe 4 6 1.47
BOL Bolivia Central and Southern America 23 31 2.8
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina Central and Eastern Europe 304 346 1.26
BWA Botswana Central and Southern Africa 6 1 2.37
BRA Brazil Central and Southern America 88 95 1.79
BRN Brunei Eastern Asia 0 1 1.82
BGR Bulgaria Central and Eastern Europe 78 95 1.44
BFA Burkina Faso Western Africa 154 132 5.93
BDI Burundi Eastern Africa 3 5 6.14
KHM Cambodia Eastern Asia 3 1 2.66
CMR Cameroon Central and Southern Africa 93 89 4.82
CAN Canada Northern America 8 3 1.59
CPV Cabo Verde Western Africa 40 53 2.34
CZE Czech Republic Central and Eastern Europe 13 11 1.43
CAF Central African Republic Central and Southern Africa 1 2 4.46
TCD Chad Central and Southern Africa 2 2 4.68
CHL Chile Central and Southern America 14 14 1.84
CHN China Eastern Asia 2464 2370 1.55
CYP Cyprus Central and Eastern Europe 1 1 1.46
COL Colombia Central and Southern America 90 93 2.07
COG Congo, Republic of the Central and Southern Africa 41 40 4.73
COD
Congo, Democratic
Republic
Central and Southern Africa 43 50 4.8
PRK Korea, South Eastern Asia 41 28 1.25
KOR Korea, North Eastern Asia 5 11 1.98
CRI Costa Rica Central and Southern America 4 1 1.91
CIV Cote d’Ivoire Western Africa 252 238 3.63
HRV Croatia Central and Eastern Europe 154 160 1.45
CUB Cuba Central and Southern America 28 28 1.46
DNK Denmark European Union 15 9 1.73
DMA Dominica Central and Southern America 14 10 2.05
DOM Dominican Republic Central and Southern America 111 106 2.36
ECU Ecuador Central and Southern America 387 474 2.29
EGY Egypt Northern Africa 1074 1111 2.87
SLV El Salvador Central and Southern America 67 61 1.95
ARE United Arab Emirates Western Asia 2 4 2.36
ERI Eritrea Eastern Africa 44 62 4.14
EST Estonia Central and Eastern Europe 0 3 1.46
ETH Ethiopia Eastern Africa 40 53 5.23
PHL Philippines Eastern Asia 1305 1322 3.06
FIN Finland European Union 6 7 1.73
FRA France European Union 148 99 2.08
GAB Gabon Central and Southern Africa 1 1 4.49
GMB Gambia, The Western Africa 8 12 3.85
GEO Georgia Western Asia 3 3 1.77
DEU Germany European Union 103 79 1.43
GHA Ghana Western Africa 633 526 4.09
JAM Jamaica Central and Southern America 1 0 2.05
JPN Japan Eastern Asia 23 29 1.4
JOR Jordan Western Asia 65 76 3.16
GRC Greece European Union 11 12 1.41
GTM Guatemala Central and Southern America 5 0 2.99
GIN Guinea Western Africa 36 44 4.93
GNB Guinea-Bissau Western Africa 6 5 4.3
GNQ Equatorial Guinea Central and Southern Africa 1 1 4.66
GUY Guyana Central and Southern America 1 0 2.14
HTI Haiti Central and Southern America 5 5 2.79
HND Honduras Central and Southern America 0 4 2.86
IND India Central and Southern Asia 926 896 2.51
IDN Indonesia Eastern Asia 5 5 2.18
IRN Iran Western Asia 48 35 1.85
IRQ Iraq Western Asia 12 16 3.41
IRL Ireland European Union 13 10 2
ISL Iceland Other European countries 7 2 1.88
ISR Israel Western Asia 18 16 2.62
KAZ Kazakhstan Central and Southern Asia 0 1 2.34
KEN Kenya Eastern Africa 7 11 3.54
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Central and Southern Asia 2 1 2.68
KWT Kuwait Western Asia 0 2 2.53
LVA Latvia Central and Eastern Europe 4 4 1.35
LBN Lebanon Western Asia 42 56 1.74
LBR Liberia Western Africa 4 5 4.81
LBY Libya Northern Africa 12 21 2.07
LIE Liechtenstein Other European countries 0 1 1.69
LTU Lithuania Central and Eastern Europe 1 6 1.29
LUX Luxembourg Other European countries 0 1 1.77
Notes: Number of newborns by mother’s country of nationality from ISTAT ad hoc processing service. TFR obtained from
Central Intelligence Agency (2013).
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Table A.5: Number of newborns and TFR for immigrant mothers, by country of nationality (cont.)
Country code Country Area of origin Number of TFR
newborns
2002 2003
MKD Macedonia Central and Eastern Europe 786 769 1.59
MDG Madagascar Eastern Africa 1 3 4.28
MWI Malawi Eastern Africa 1 1 5.66
MYS Malaysia Eastern Asia 2 0 2.58
MLI Mali Western Africa 9 21 6.16
MLT Malta Other European countries 3 1 1.54
MAR Morocco Northern Africa 6108 5583 2.15
MRT Mauritania Western Africa 22 14 4.07
MUS Mauritius Eastern Africa 141 144 1.77
MEX Mexico Central and Southern America 9 11 2.29
MDA Moldova Central and Eastern Europe 70 150 1.56
MCO Monaco Other European countries 4 6 1.52
MNG Mongolia Eastern Asia 1 0 2.22
MOZ Mozambique Eastern Africa 1 2 5.27
MMR Myanmar Eastern Asia 1 1 0
NAM Namibia Central and Southern Africa 1 0 2.25
NPL Nepal Central and Southern Asia 3 3 2.3
NIC Nicaragua Central and Southern America 0 1 1.99
NER Niger Western Africa 14 23 6.89
NGA Nigeria Western Africa 670 705 5.25
NOR Norway Other European countries 3 3 1.86
NZL New Zealand Oceania 3 1 2.05
OMN Oman Western Asia 0 1 2.86
NLD Netherlands European Union 35 22 1.78
PAK Pakistan Central and Southern Asia 599 558 2.86
PAN Panama Central and Southern America 1 0 2.38
PRY Paraguay Central and Southern America 3 6 1.96
PER Peru Central and Southern America 606 691 2.22
POL Poland Central and Eastern Europe 299 418 1.33
PRT Portugal European Union 21 21 1.52
GBR United Kingdom European Union 71 60 1.9
ROU Romania Central and Eastern Europe 1645 2480 1.32
RWA Rwanda Eastern Africa 2 1 4.62
RUS Russia Central and Eastern Europe 57 69 1.61
SLB Solomon Islands Oceania 0 1 3.36
WSM Samoa Oceania 0 1 2.94
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis Central and Southern America 1 0 1.78
SMR San Marino Other European countries 5 4 1.49
VAT Holy See Other European countries 0 1 0
SEN Senegal Western Africa 555 571 4.52
SRB/MNG Serbia Montenegro Central and Eastern Europe 1076 1008 1.42
SYC Seychelles Eastern Africa 4 5 1.88
SLE Sierra Leone Western Africa 13 10 4.83
SGP Singapore Eastern Asia 1 2 0.8
SYR Syria Western Asia 67 62 2.68
SVK Slovakia Central and Eastern Europe 11 20 1.39
SVN Slovenia Central and Eastern Europe 12 8 1.33
SOM Somalia Eastern Africa 71 63 6.08
ESP Spain European Union 40 36 1.48
LKA Sri Lanka Central and Southern Asia 954 934 2.13
USA United States Northern America 45 45 2.01
ZAF South Africa Central and Southern Africa 5 2 2.23
SDN Sudan Northern Africa 22 16 3.92
SWE Sweden European Union 14 8 1.88
CHE Switzerland Other European countries 14 18 1.54
TAW Taiwan Eastern Asia 8 5 1.11
TZA Tanzania Eastern Africa 6 3 4.95
PSE State of Palestine Western Asia 8 11 4.24
THA Thailand Eastern Asia 8 7 1.5
TGO Togo Western Africa 30 21 4.53
TTO Trinidad and Tobago Central and Southern America 1 0 1.71
TUN Tunisia Northern Africa 1729 1716 2
TUR Turkey Central and Eastern Europe 126 144 2.08
TKM Turkmenistan Central and Southern Asia 0 1 2.1
UKR Ukraine Central and Eastern Europe 105 189 1.3
UGA Uganda Eastern Africa 3 2 5.97
HUN Hungary Central and Eastern Europe 30 32 1.42
URY Uruguay Central and Southern America 5 9 1.84
UZB Uzbekistan Central and Southern Asia 5 6 1.8
VEN Venezuela Central and Southern America 16 14 2.35
VNM Vietnam Eastern Asia 9 13 1.85
YEM Yemen Western Asia 5 5 4.09
ZMB Zambia Eastern Africa 1 0 5.76
- Stateless - 0 3 -
Notes: Number of newborns by mother’s country of nationality from ISTAT ad hoc processing service. TFR obtained from
Central Intelligence Agency (2013)
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Table A.6: Effect of the immigration law on probability of having first child and fertility intentions,
subsample excluding immigrant mothers and fathers with less than 2 years of residence in Italy, marginal
effects
PSDD
Matching method Probability to have the first child fertility intentions
Panel a) control group of immigrant mothers with acquired Italian nationality
Nearest-neighbour 0.064** -0.058
(0.028) (0.047)
Radius 0.072** -0.058
(0.031) (0.047)
Kernel 0.064** -0.061
(0.028) (0.054)
Panel b) control group of Italian mothers
Nearest-neighbour 0.038 -0.042
(0.034) (0.054)
Radius 0.037** -0.032
(0.016) (0.038)
Kernel 0.032* -0.039
(0.019) (0.049)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets obtained with two-step procedure of Donald & Lang (2007). Significant levels: p-value ***
≤ 0.01, ** ≤ 0.05, * ≤ 0.1.
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